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EU’s Economic Governance in Transition
T he European Union’s (EU) economic governance is in a transitional phase. After the outbreak of the global fi nancial crisis, and in the midst of the eu-
rozone debt crisis that followed, the EU embarked on an ambitious reform effort. 
Reforms ranged from addressing loopholes and updating regulations in all areas 
of fi nancial activity, to the strengthening of monitoring and coordination pro-
cesses for fi scal policy and macroeconomic developments, and from establishing 
unconventional monetary policy facilities to setting up entirely new institutions, 
including bailout mechanisms. 
The progress made notwithstanding, the reform of EU’s economic governance 
remains incomplete. The main cause for this is the way reforms were designed in 
the fi rst place. Both the handling of the crisis and the EU’s economic governance 
reform were subject to substantial political pressures. The asymmetrical nature 
of the shock, where some countries in the periphery of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) suffered a deep economic crisis, whereas countries 
in the European North went largely unscathed, and the lack of institutional pre-
paredness for such an eventuality, turned the policy responses and the reform 
effort into a highly political process. Negotiations took place in an increasingly 
intergovernmental framework, where the states contributing the funds for the 
bailout of crisis-hit economies had a de facto negotiating advantage, which al-
lowed them to determine the terms of both bailouts and reforms. 
A key consideration of creditor countries was the issue of moral hazard; i.e. 
the likelihood that debtor countries would use fi scal solidarity instruments to 
avoid implementing politically costly, but economically necessary, reforms. The 
desire to limit moral hazard, itself rooted in underlying ideological and material 
considerations, dictated the harsh conditionality that accompanied bailout pro-
grams, but also the design of reforms, with a view to enhance supervisory and 
control mechanisms, while minimizing the commitment of resources and the 
delegation of powers at the supranational level. 
The outcome is, unsurprisingly, not satisfactory. Many of the reforms adopt-
ed are not considered effective or suffi cient, and more ambitious proposals failed 
to progress. What is more, many of the proposed reforms remain unfi nished or 
incomplete, as economic recovery has weakened the catalytic pressure of the 
crisis for reform. In view of the widely acknowledged need to complete the re-
form process, in recent years, the European institutions have put forward a wide 
array of proposals, often highly ambitious. Unfortunately, the political economy 
stakes involved remain signifi cant; dealing with the adverse legacy of the crisis 
for a number of member states, requires further adjustment, which comes at 
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substantial economic and political cost. The distribution of this cost is a highly 
political issue, which continues to divide the Union, between risk reducing and 
risk sharing options. In view of this political economy struggle, the potential for 
substantial further reform of EU’s economic governance seems limited. 
This is a problem for the EU because the European economy has not yet fully 
recovered from the crisis and continues to face many challenges, old and new. The 
crisis casts a dense and long shadow; its legacy includes non-performing loans, 
high levels of public debt and output gaps. The crisis’ legacy also includes the need 
for a smooth exit from the loose monetary policy regime, whose adverse impact on 
individual and institutional (e.g. pension funds) savers and distorting effect on as-
set prices is starting to be increasingly felt. The new challenge of the coronavirus, 
now in full swing over Europe is going to deepen these legacy problems and add 
new ones, particularly as the countries that seem most badly hit at the moment, 
are some of the countries that also suffered during the Eurozone debt crisis.
In addition, the EU is also facing a number of broader challenges; some of 
them are linked to global economic competition, such as managing the impact 
of the US trade dispute with both itself and China, improving the productivity 
of European economies and promoting the policies necessary for the transition 
to the 4th industrial revolution; others are linked to long-term structural chal-
lenges, like its poor demographic dynamics. These issues need to be addressed 
in an increasingly Eurosceptic political environment, itself a legacy of the debt 
and refugee crises. Although the recent European elections did not verify fears 
of a large anti-European wave, the new landscape does not create optimism for 
the necessary coalition building to move forward with more ambitious reforms.
The objective of this special issue is to elaborate on these issues by critically 
examining progress in the ongoing effort to reform the EU’s economic govern-
ance, in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis. The issue includes four research 
papers and three research notes dealing with different aspects and debates on 
EU’s economic governance. 
The fi rst research article by Nicos Christodoulakis provides the background 
for the rest of the issue, as it offers an overview of the development of the EMU 
since the 1990s and examines the asymmetries that led to the crisis. Christodou-
lakis focuses on what is arguably the most important parameter, the convergence 
of per capita income among member states, which is after all, one of the funda-
mental objectives of European economic integration. Christodoulakis shows ini-
tially a weakening of the convergence process following the launch of the common 
currency and later, after the outbreak of the crisis, a reversal of convergence, 
particularly between the core member states and the old member states of the 
Southern periphery, which were hit by the crisis and were affected adversely by 
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the bailout policies that followed. The article focuses on certain key factors -pub-
lic indebtedness, institutions and investment activity- to account for the polariza-
tion between the North and South of the euro area and proposes an EU invest-
ment plan as the most effective policy to foster growth and restore convergence.
The next article by Nikos Koutsiaras, offers a detailed analysis of the 20-
year old journey of the European Central Bank (ECB) from a bastion of monetary 
orthodoxy to a qualifi ed lender and investor of last resort. Koutsiaras shows how, 
despite the ECB’s proclaimed independence from political interference, being 
a stateless monetary authority, effectively has entailed striking political com-
promises. The political infl uence of the dominant member states became par-
ticularly evident during the crisis. It delayed and constrained the ECB’s policy 
reaction, and prioritized the provision of liquidity to the banking industry. Mario 
Draghi’s later policy reversal, which according to Koutsiaras was only partial, 
came with restrictions and was in any case, inevitable, given the critical stage 
to which the crisis had deteriorated and the stern refusal of creditor countries to 
consider fi scal responses. As a result, ECB’s new facilities and unconventional 
policy initiatives became, unreluctantly, the ‘only game in town’. 
The third article by Dimitris Katsikas reviews the reform of EU’s fi scal gov-
ernance. Beginning with an overview of the literature, Katsikas shows that de-
termining the optimal level and instruments of fi scal governance in a monetary 
union of sovereign states is a complicated task; it needs to balance different 
national preferences and economic idiosyncrasies, allowing enough fl exibility to 
deal with asymmetric shocks, while discouraging fi scal mismanagement, and 
minimizing spillover effects when it happens. At the same time, it needs to pro-
vide the means for effective fi scal management over the business cycle and build 
the necessary mechanisms to deal with a common external shock. The political 
compromise that led to EMU did not meet these requirements. Its weaknesses, 
revealed by the global fi nancial crisis, contributed to Eurozone’s deterioration 
into a second, debt crisis. Creditor countries dictated the provisions of EU’s new 
fi scal governance. Being essentially a reinforced version of the pre-crisis frame-
work, the new fi scal governance has tried to balance confl icting objectives with 
little success and it is hardly more effective than its predecessor. As a result, the 
reformed fi scal governance, needs now to be reformed anew.
The fi nal research article by Athanassios Kolliopoulos reviews the progress 
of the Banking Union, one of the most important reforms undertaken by the EU 
after the crisis. Kolliopoulos argues that a ‘window of opportunity’ was opened 
in 2012, facilitated by both the acute pressure of the debt crisis and a number of 
political developments in important countries. Initial progress notwithstanding, 
the completion of the original design has not been an easy task. Following the 
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establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and most of the com-
ponents of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), progress became diffi cult as 
economic recovery eased the pressures for reform, political developments created 
uncertainty and perhaps most importantly, the remaining reforms and particu-
larly the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) came up against the moral 
hazard issue, as it entails pooling of resources and mutualization of risk. For the 
moment this obstacle seems insurmountable and further progress seems unlikely.
The fi rst of the research notes, by Achilleas Mitsos reviews the recalibra-
tion of policy, institutional and power relations in EU’s governance as a result 
of the crisis. Mitsos describes how new intervening powers have been acquired 
by ‘stealth’ in the context of the new governance, as surveillance metrics and 
policy recommendations have expanded into areas not covered by EU legislation. 
This trend has been strengthened by the amplifi ed use of conditionality in terms 
that get increasingly broader. In addition, there has been a major re-balancing in 
terms of decision-making institutions; the European Council has emerged as the 
dominant European decision-making organ, marginalizing the European Parlia-
ment and transforming the role of the Commission into an implementation ser-
vice. This ‘new intergovernmentalism’ may be the most lasting legacy of the crisis.
The next research note, by Dimitra Tsigkou reviews the recent comparative 
political economy literature and the debate between the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) and Growth Regimes theories. Tsigkou describes the different arguments, 
which are particularly relevant for the design of EMU’s economic governance, 
given that the outcome of this debate may provide answers to the quintessential 
question of how to create a successful monetary union whose member states 
belong to very different models of capitalism. Tsigkou believes that some form of 
‘epistemological bridge-building’ between the theories could improve our under-
standing of Eurozone’s predicament. 
The fi nal research note, by Pery Bazoti examines in more detail the politics 
of the Banking Union’s missing link, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS). Bazoti describes the bank-sovereign ‘doom-loop’ and the moral hazard 
issues that constitute the justifi cation and obstacle to EDIS’ completion respec-
tively. Bazoti goes on to explore different policy proposals on the institutional 
design of the EDIS, in order to limit the potential of moral hazard abuse. Bazoti 
concludes with some thoughts on the prospects of completing the EDIS; in her 
view unless rules are introduced to limit moral hazard to the satisfaction of Ger-
many, further progress should not be expected.
Dimitris Katsikas, Assistant Professor, 
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
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